Description of Rent Seeking as Applied to Political Corruption
Rules and regulations should be simplified and easily accessible to the people. Reinforcing hierarchical control through state institutions may reduce corruption due to asymmetric information in monitoring and controlling accountability of the officials. But those who are paid to monitor the actions of lower-level officials can themselves be bribed not to blow the whistle.
The attempt here is to accumulate the existing knowledge regarding corruption, its internal mechanism, interacting agents, effects of corruption on economic performance of economies and the policy implications of the issue. If politicians choose their activities on the basis of expected returns, rates of return on alternative activities will be equated and, in that sense, markets will be competitive. In most cases, politicians do not perceive themselves to be rent-seekers and, generally speaking, individuals and firms do not specialise in rent seeking.
- Comparison of Individual Right Indicated in the Bill of Rights and Constitution of Latvia
- Description of Rent Seeking as Applied to Political Corruption
- Labor Relations in Latvia
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