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Publicēts: 07.09.2005.
Valoda: Angļu
Līmenis: Vidusskolas
Literatūras saraksts: Nav
Atsauces: Nav
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Darba fragmentsAizvērt

Even the above proposals regarding insiders will seem fairly impractical in a political sence, except that it is interesting to note how they overlap with the position of fairly established corporate interests in recent debates over corporate governance reform, where the question is asked how to make directors of corporations exercise better oversight on behalf of shareholders.
The National Association of Corporate Directors - an influential professional organization closely aligned with corporate interests - issued a report on director compensation and professionalism which examined how best to correct certain agency chains involving corporate board directors, so that the directors represent the shareholders interest.
In cases like WorldCom (where an outside trustee is tasked with making certain proposals to reform the company), it is worth considering a requirement that stock granted to insiders carry double liability (double liability might also be attached to special classes of stock designed to provide insiders with extra proxy voting power). These "deep pocket" shares might create an incentive to pay closer attention to potential sources of "externalities" that could potentially bankrupt the company.

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